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Much has been written about Chinese enterprise in sub-Saharan Africa, most bad 
and some good, which is mainly due to the profit-driven approach, where aid distribution 
is tied to trade, directly or indirectly. The United States’ relationship to the region is 
fundamentally different, following a Western model of conditional aid attached to 
structural and social reform. The U.S. trade relationships with sub-Saharan Africa are 
separate from its aid levers, representing only 1% of total foreign business, within the 
time frame of this study. The literature is divided as to which of the two countries’ 
economic engagement is best for sub-Saharan nations. Based on the analysis, which 
appears to be most instructive for the United States’ and sub-Saharan African countries’ 
mutual development goals, this research supports a trade model, in general, and appears 
to be most informative for the United States’ version that separates trade and aid. China 
implicitly links aid to trade, which is found to benefit sub-Saharan Africa more so than 
U.S. aid alone, but its results are not measurable by normal foreign aid standards. The 
goal of this paper is to inform the broad economic engagement approach, which best 
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Increasingly, the world’s two greatest economies engage with 49 of the least 
greatest. Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the world’s most resource-rich, youthful 
countries, but also experiences, by far, the largest amount of human suffering.1 The 
contrasts between the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the United States, and China are 
sharp. In 2014, gross domestic product purchase power parity (GDP PPP)2 per capita for 
the United States was $54,629, and for China $7,590, while for the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, it averaged $1,776.3 The respective purpose and style of U.S. and 
Chinese economic engagement with sub-Saharan Africa has been greatly debated. 
Rigorous discussion surrounds questions of which economy has greater positive 
economic impact on sub-Saharan Africa economies. This study compares U.S. and 
Chinese economic impact on sub-Saharan Africa GDP growth data. Of particular interest 
is the form and style of that economic engagement to discern best practices to yield the 
greatest GDP growth. Throughout this study, Chinese aid and trade, when considered 
together, are interchangeable with the term “economic engagement” and is categorically 
equivalent to U.S. trade. Those methods are examined qualitatively and quantitatively in 
this work, as both the United States and China intensify their focus on the subcontinent. 
The past two decades have seen a dramatic shift in thinking toward the strategic 
importance of sub-Saharan African countries and the continent as a whole. The United 
States considers that sub-Saharan Africa economic stability is directly linked to its own 
national security.4 Some U.S. officials view China’s economic interests and the way the 
country conducts itself on the African continent as a possible existential threat to that 
                                                 
1 Population Crisis Committee, The International Human Suffering Index for 141 Countries 
(Washington, DC: Population Crisis Committee, 1992). 
2 When referring to gross domestic product (GDP), this paper will mean gross domestic product 
purchase power parity (GDP PPP) unless otherwise specified. 
3 “GDP per Capita (Current US$),” last modified February 10, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.  
4 David E. Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s Advance in Africa Is 
Underestimated and Africa’s Potential Underappreciated (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 2–56. 
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stability, and thus, a threat to American interests.5 Chinese-African economic activity in 
sub-Saharan Africa has grown rapidly over the past several decades and is a controversial 
topic as to type, participants, purpose, amount, and effects. Simply, Chinese methods are 
changing the sub-Saharan landscape.6  
China, for its part, recognizes the region’s vast resource wealth and focuses on 
those countries rich in commodities. Analysis of the Chinese model may inform 
alternative methods of sub-Saharan economic engagement for the United States, 
including broadening current models and future development possibilities. Studies in this 
area could also have important implications for U.S. global foreign policy strategies in 
developing nations. Therefore, increased importance should be placed on quantitatively 
understanding Sino economic engagement methods as compared to those of the United 
States. Before the empirical examination, historical and scholarly literature lenses best 
frame the issue. 
                                                 
5 Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard, Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority 
(INSS Occasional Paper 57) (USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2004), 
53–71. 
6 Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?,” in 
Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Jane Golley and Ligang Song (Canberra: Australia 
National University Press, 2011), 203. 
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II. CONTEXT 
Most of sub-Saharan Africa spent much of the 20th century either under colonial 
authority or in a struggle for independence. During the Cold War and after independence, 
many world powers treated sub-Saharan African countries as “convenient pawn[s] on the 
global chessboard.”7 Since then, the literature acknowledges that the United States and 
China have had different purposes and goals in sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. economic 
engagement with the subcontinent is traditionally based on the Western aid model, while 
the Chinese form is historically trade-centered. The trend continues positively after 
norming for strategic interests in support of national goals; the United States usually 
pairing aid with conditions of demonstrated structural improvement within a given state 
and Chinese policy forbidding any conditionality beyond the terms of the transaction.8  
The literature underscores a division between support and rejection for the 
conditional structural adjustment model. Typically, foreign aid in Africa is largely based 
on shared ideology between the donor and aid recipient. Since numerous countries 
compose the sub-Saharan Africa continent, these ideological mindsets are linked to the 
varied historical contexts in which they have developed. Add to that, the many varied 
existing donors for equally different backgrounds and goals. Among the differences are 
some distinct positions between two approaches, the United States’ and China’s. An 
enthusiast’s camp for the Western model is Claggett, Munemo, and Zhang. They argue 
the Western model works well at improving human rights, reducing corruption, and 
encouraging good government.9 Sachs et al. posit that conditioning aid on governance for 
state development, alone, changes few fundamental issues. They assert initial large surges 
of development assistance are required to break out of the poverty cycle; only then, can a 
                                                 
7 Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, “America, China, and the Scramble for Africa’s Oil,” Review of 
African Political Economy 33, no. 108 (June 1, 2006): 297. 
8 E. Tylor Claggett, Jonathan Munemo, and Lijuan Zhang, “Determinants of Foreign Aid to Africa: A 
Comparison of the United States and China,” The Journal of Global Commerce Research 2, no. 4 (Fall 
2010): 40–50.  
9 Ibid.  
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developing nation achieve meaningful change.10 Alternatively, Easterly regards “big 
push” aid narratives defunct in Africa. With simple regression analysis, he argues that 
poverty traps are not overcome by large surges of foreign aid, no matter the quality of 
governance. He also illustrates that “takeoffs are not associated with aid investment or 
education spending.”11 Despite this analysis, the aforementioned aid myths dominated 
Western literature and practice since the 1950s, only to return to this century no more 
successful. The contrast of economic engagement through aid versus trade is stark. 
Englebert and Tull argue the legacy of external conditions, through traditional Western-
style aid flows, post-conflict, is a type of market competition of its own that dis-
incentivizes recipients.12 Essentially, the need for aid becomes the market response for 
more aid. They further contend indigenous state creation is indeed possible, as found in 
Somaliland and Uganda.13 
Today, the region bustles with Chinese economic activity. Recent scholarly 
activity surrounding this Chinese version of foreign aid is equally robust, with two 
divisions of thought predominating; some offer measured praise, while others supply 
sharp criticism. Those in the pro camp suggest any direct foreign investment on the 
continent helps those affected economies, and ultimately, the locals.14 They contend it is 
almost impossible to imagine that sub-Saharan African regimes would not prefer China’s 
unfettered aid without structural or humanitarian pre-conditions. Moreover, these 
scholars say that China’s version is the perfect formula for developing desperately needed 
infrastructure throughout the region.15 They continue that it is only right that sub-Saharan 
leaders decide the fate of their own countries’ precious resources in the global 
                                                 
10 Jeffrey Sachs et al., “Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2004, 
117–216.  
11 William Easterly, “Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in Economic 
Development,” Journal of Economic Growth 11, no. 4 (2006): 289–318. 
12 Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about 
Failed States,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 107–123. 
13 Ibid. 
14 James Reilly and Bates Gill, “The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa,” The Washington 
Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2007): 37–52. 
15 Ibid. 
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marketplace. Although it is not clear whether the economic success China has established 
in sub-Saharan Africa can withstand significant financial crisis. Despite world trends, 
sub-Saharan Africa is in the beginnings of economic renaissance.16 A fact not unnoticed 
by a country already intimately familiar with an emerging market. 
Brown reveals that Mao Zedong initiated and significantly increased aid on the 
African continent.17 Furthermore, his thesis is that a modified form of Chinese-style 
economic engagement with sub-Saharan Africa will do more for development than any 
other form to date.18 Raine notes the changing relationship of China with Africa over the 
last 30 years. According to her, the Mainland has developed the most recent engagement 
style since the 1990s, when soft power increasingly became the currency for resources 
without political precondition. She continues, saying it is just this sort of economic 
engagement that will ultimately redeem sub-Saharan African countries.19 Yin and 
Vaschetto also report that Chinese strategy in Africa is based on a not-to-interfere-with 
government approach to aid, which, they say, is used to gain soft power, build national 
trust, and develop long-term trade plans.20 Gill et al. believe China’s expanded method of 
aid through mutually beneficial trade is a net-positive for sub-Saharan African countries. 
They assert their strategic approach is about to takeoff in Africa, developmentally 
speaking.21  
Indigenous populations, according to Alden, welcome the increased Chinese 
presence. He describes China as a new source of revenue without traditional reform 
strings attached and that Africans prefer such an arrangement, despite any resulting 
unbalanced relationship. For these reasons, a barrage of Chinese diplomatic-led trade 
                                                 
16Antonio Guerrero, “In from the Cold,” Global Finance 24, no. 2 (2010): 24–26. 
17 Brown, “Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s Advance in Africa Is Underestimated and 
Africa’s Potential Underappreciated,” 2–56. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Sarah Raine, China’s African Challenges (New York: Abingdon, Oxon 2009), 23–24. 
20 Jason Z. Yin and Sofia Vaschetto, “China’s Business Engagement in Africa,” Chinese Economy 44, 
no. 2 (2011): 43–55. 
21 Bates Gill, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison, China’s Expanding Role in Africa: 
Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 
6–7. 
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may overtake Western economic engagement efforts on the African continent.22 Finally, 
Weisbrod and Whalley describe Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa as 
impacting respective economies by one-half a percentage point growth. They conclude 
Chinese aid is relatively effective. According to their study, China contributed over 10% 
of the total FDI flows to those same economies.  
This study raises some potential issues. As previously stated, the Chinese 
approach to sub-Saharan Africa differs from the American model in many ways related to 
its social, economic, and political strategies. Chiefly, Chinese aid is focused on 
commercial cooperation. Those lines are blurred between aid, economic, and political 
relationships. The interconnection makes separating specific issues surrounding aid and 
trade impossible. Also, the general incompleteness of Chinese economic data on sub-
Saharan African aid further obscures the matter. Since they do not conform to the 
international donor standard, the available information is difficult to assimilate in 
accordance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Much of what is known about China’s aid actually comes through speeches, conferences, 
news releases, and recipient countries.23  
                                                 
22 Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 147–164. 
23 Sven Grimm et al., Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information of 
Chinese External Financial Flows (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Stellenbosch University Center for Chinese 
Studies, 2011), 1–12.  
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III. HYPOTHESIS 
Despite challenges, it is possible to present a comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of the U.S. and Chinese models using statistical data of the two national 
approaches and their measured effectiveness according to sub-Saharan Africa GDP 
growth. A review of the literature informed the following two research hypotheses tested 
in this work: 
• Hypothesis (H1): U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates greater 
positive correlation to sub-Saharan African GDP growth than U.S. aid in 
the same economies for the time period from 2001 to 2010. 
• Hypothesis (H2): U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates a 
greater positive correlation to sub-Saharan African GDP growth than 
Chinese trade in the same economies for the time period from 2001 to 
2010. 
Using these hypotheses as a basis for study, this work intends to compare U.S. 
and Chinese economic engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. Through research of available 
data, this study endeavors to draw conclusions from relative successes and failures of 
U.S. and Chinese programs, and identify broad factors explaining respective influence on 
sub-Saharan African countries’ GDP growth. The objective is to critically consider how 
the United States can further develop its own approach to sub-Saharan African 
engagement according to observed Chinese methods, perhaps allowing greater 
understanding of how to achieve U.S. economic and strategic goals for the region. This 
study assumes natural correlations between economic growth and societal development. 
First, the paper provided quantitative context of the current debate from the 
available literature. Next, the work drills down to U.S. and Chinese practices from 1990 
forward, when the nature of the aid relationships shifted in sub-Saharan Africa.24 The 
researcher finally reviews the available and relevant data in an effort to illuminate both 
                                                 
24 Raine, China’s African Challenges, 23. 
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national approaches by correlating data populated from U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports and the World Bank database.25  
Some argue that donor aid props up poor governance and intensifies corruption, 
which thereby creates false markets and distresses real ones.26 Those who support the 
idea of developed nations providing foreign aid argue the process results in a greater 
positive net effect, despite irregularities.27 Empirical and statistical tools can test both 
hypotheses according to shared measures. Among those, the GDP is the most common. 
This work endeavors to evaluate U.S. and Chinese economic engagement impacts on 
GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa to allow greater understanding of China’s economic 
engagement with Africa, in order to impact the region most positively and achieve U.S. 
strategic and economic goals. Based on the analysis, this body of research should make a 
case for a model instructive to the U.S. economic engagement strategy in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
                                                 
25 David Gootnick, Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in United States and Chinese Economic Engagement 
(GAO-13-199) (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2013); “The World 
Bank GDP Growth (Annual %),” accessed February 12, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp. 
mktp.kd.zg. 
26 Easterly, “Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in Economic 
Development,” 289–318. 
27 Gill, Huang, and Morrison, China’s Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States, 
6–7. 
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IV. WESTERN MODEL CHALLENGED 
The Western model is generally made up of four types of foreign aid that Africa 
receives: emergency relief, financial, technical labor, and military. Emergency relief aid 
is typically distributed in the form of food or non-food items (e.g., emergency packages 
to families) or medical resources and services during natural disaster situations. Financial 
aid is usually distributed in the form of loans or grants that do not have to be repaid. 
Technical labor tends to come through volunteer programs or commissioned by 
governments to assist with agricultural needs, such as enhancing farm efficiency and 
productivity. Lastly, military aid comes in the form of military hardware and training.28  
The literature review reveals no apparent combined aid and trade strategy for the 
United States. Various aid programs and trade initiatives, without linkages or a cogent 
overarching plan, hallmark the policy of the past several decades. Although not a former 
colonizing country, a brief overview of the traditional aid architecture reveals the United 
States does coordinate its aid flows with the international aid standard bearer, the OECD. 
In keeping with that organization’s 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in fact, 
no ties exist between aid and U.S. products or services.29 The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), the main organ of the OECD, organizes “rules and norms” of foreign 
aid standards. The membership consists of donor countries and is self-regulating. China is 
not an OECD member, although its donor behavior is of great interest to the DAC. 
Normally, foreign aid or official development assistance (ODA) is defined as 
concessional loans comprised of 25% grant monies for the purpose of welfare and 
development. It can be bilateral or multilateral and channeled from donors through 
international banks to recipient countries.30 Debt relief and technical assistance are not 
ODA. Development economists traditionally see these areas as a way to bridge the 
savings gap of countries to allow them to break out from the poverty trap using the big 
                                                 
28 Military engagement is excluded from this analysis. 
29 Gootnick, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in United States and Chinese Economic Engagement, 6. 
30 Brautigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much,” 203–223. 
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push theory.31 The other type of OECD aid is termed other official flows (OOF). As 
mentioned, the former are concessional loans and grants defined by the OECD. The latter 
(OOF) are not concessional and do not include export credits. The OECD defines OOF as 
funds for firms from the donor country to subsidize or guarantee foreign business 
transactions to protect investor risk.32 The United States goes through international 
organizations to deliver a bulk of its assistance advancing U.S.-African foreign aid 
policy.  
The U.S. sub-Saharan African goals include, “strengthening democratic 
institutions, supporting human rights, improving health and education, and helping sub-
Saharan African countries build global trade.”33 The U.S. model works by distributing 
aid dollars through U.S. agencies, international development banks, and non-
governmental organization (NGOs). Most U.S. aid has governance and humanitarian 
stipulations attached. Currently, the United States provides billions in annual, indirect aid 
to Africa through international financial institutions (IFIs) and United Nations (UN) 
agencies. According to a U.S. congressional brief, the monies are loaned through the 
World Bank’s “soft loan affiliate,” the International Development Association (IDA), 
Africa’s largest aid source.34 Many in the traditional aid community applauded the 
findings of a UN report that claims the United States is one of the “least generous 
donors” (when contribution level is considered in proportion to national GDP).35 It 
argues that even by matching the expected giving percentage level, the U.S. model will 
not do enough to transform sub-Saharan African countries into sustainable economies,36 
despite the fact that U.S. aid dollars total more than all the other countries combined. 
                                                 
31 Sachs et al., “Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap,” 117–216.  
32 Brautigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?,” 203–223. 
33 Gootnick, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in United States and Chinese Economic Engagement,” 12. 
34 Ted Dagne, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues (RL33591) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2011), 8–13. 
35 Celia W. Dugger, “U.N. Report Cites United States and Japan as the ‘Least Generous Donors,’” 
New York Times, September 8, 2005.  
36 Sachs et al., “Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap,” 118–239. 
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More is not always better. Easterly offers strong criticism of Washington’s 
continued support of past methods. Some in his camp describe the results of various 
levels of American conditional aid over the last 40 years as a frustrating story of 
stagnation with little to show for the billions of U.S. aid dollars spent.37 The late 
economist and author Lord Peter Bauer perhaps best summarized criticism of this U.S. 
approach to foreign aid as “an excellent method for transferring money from poor people 
in rich countries to rich people in poor countries.”38 He made that statement in 1972. 
Many voices have since joined his plea for reform.  
In an effort to adjust to the changing environment, the United States is working on 
alternate strategies to tackle the systemic issues. Joining with sub-Saharan African 
countries, they are focusing on problems of transparency and good governance to 
promote a positive business culture and tackle financial corruption and terrorism.39 The 
United States has intensified focus on sub-Saharan trade in recent years. The U.S. 
Commerce Department is organizing African global business summits and officially 
cooperating with the African economic communities and other organizations to promote 
U.S. business expansion in those countries. U.S. ambassadors are leading similar changes 
in cooperation with sub-Saharan African countries to facilitate host-nation business 
leader delegations to the United States to meet American business leaders. The current 
administration describes its future vision of American and sub-Saharan African growth, 
intermingled, and seeking local partnerships in support of their mutually beneficial 
success.40  
Putting White House plans into action, The Africa Entrepreneur Facility was 
promptly created. It is a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
                                                 
37 Easterly, “Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in Economic 
Development,” 289–318. 
38 Peter Bauer, Dissent and Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 326. 
39 Neal S. Wolin, “Deputy Secretary Wolin to Visit Central and Southern Africa November 10–12, 
2012” (press release, Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., 2012), http://search.proquest.com.lib 
proxy.nps.edu/docview/1150133169/13C689B48E167B57CE1/17?accountid=12702. 
40 Rebecca Blank, “Expanding Access to New Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa for American 
Businesses,” Guest Blog on Commerce Blog (November 30, 2012), http://search.proquest.com.libproxy. 
nps.edu/docview/1221234039/13C685EF7DF5F2DD339/10?accountid=12702. 
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and African Development Bank (ADB) collaboration. The enterprise is helping sub-
Saharan African entrepreneurs present successful business proposals to private investors 
through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and attaching loan 
guarantees to resulting deals.41 It is through these types of partnerships the U.S. 
government is engaging entrepreneurial potential in sub-Saharan Africa from the bottom-
up.  
That potential is evidenced by efforts like the USAID mandate to execute the 
Congressional African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), designed to “grow 
economies, stability, and reduce poverty.”42 First, trade hubs were established in Accra, 
Nairobi, and Gaborone. The initial iteration worked with more than 234,000 firms and 
660,000 entrepreneurs in Africa, putting two billion U.S. dollars (USD) put into 
infrastructure, and it connected 650,000 new African users to the Internet.43 It is also 
through public-private entrepreneurial partnerships that the United States engages sub-
Saharan business. With initiatives like the Innovation Summit and Mentoring 
Partnership, the State Department facilitates some of America’s most successful 
companies and public organizations to come alongside high-potential African youth, 
especially women.44 The State Department, along with partner NGOs and corporations, 
further promotes female entrepreneurship through the African Women’s 
Entrepreneurship Program (AWEP). It is a program that focuses on strategic planning 
and significant barriers to African businesswomen. The first conference in 2012 attracted 
120 aspirants from 44 African countries and has grown in successive years.45  
Private organizations partner with local entrepreneurs and sub-Saharan African 
economies in other ways. Micro-lending is one method that provides a “seedbed” for 
                                                 
41 Henrietta H. Fore and Panel, “Partnership to Support Entrepreneurs in Africa” (moderated speech, 
in Washington, DC, April 15, 2008). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 African Press Organisation, “Africa: State Department in Collaboration with Meridian International 
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growth.46 It is a well-documented and proven concept that has transformed some of the 
poorest individuals from receiving handouts into those earning sustainable above average 
livelihoods. The Entrepreneurial Finance Lab is using this tool through sub-Saharan 
African banks to distribute small-to-medium business loans.47 The “BRAC” 
organization, once called Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, is now a micro-
lending organization for many other developing regions. It, too, has successfully 
invigorated entrepreneurial classes through micro-finance. The committee trains 
entrepreneurs and then aids their launch among a value-chain-network of BRAC assisted 
entities, which thus creates an entrepreneurial ecosystem at the grassroots level. The 
program inspires smart commerce where it is needed most, from the bottom rungs of the 
social ladder. It provides the information and opportunity while local entrepreneurs bring 
the rest.48 Another good example of partnering is found in Ghana. Social entrepreneur 
Esoko assisted the country’s agro-business access markets guided by USAID.49 
Together, they developed the Market Information Systems and Traders Organizations in 
West Africa (MISTOWA) system and increased agricultural information exchange in 13 
West African countries. The system leveraged available cellphone technology to give 
food producers real-time, agro-market information, which allowed them to better “time” 
the market. The result was an increase in efficiency and commodity prices at the producer 
level that grew the entire industry and boosted the local economy.50  
The list of new entrepreneurial engagement activity continues. The U.S. Center 
for Disease Control (CDC) is also in the fight. It is attacking the intersection of public 
health and economic wellbeing by sending out “business missionaries” with Masters of 
Business Administration (MBA) degrees to the least developed countries (LDCs). Its job 
                                                 
46 Barbara Grosh and Gloria Somolekae, “Mighty Oaks from Little Acorns: Can Microenterprise 
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is to advise micro to medium size companies, with the intent of bridging them to global 
markets.  
Some sub-Saharan African countries remain resistant to expansion and the 
globalization of local industry. The development of Africa’s LDCs requires an educated 
and effective entrepreneurial class, with supporting government structures.51 Small to 
medium companies are crucial investment targets for those too small for commercial 
lending and too large for microfinance. The U.S. State Department now encourages 
innovation in American foreign aid methods, going further to facilitate African business 
with the public-private partnerships through initiatives like the Partnership to Support 
Entrepreneurs in Africa. The centerpiece of the strategy is attracting the U.S. corporations 
and international development partners who envisage African entrepreneurial growth as 
the part of their own future organizational growth. Access to capital is highlighted as the 
chief obstacle to business success.52 
Another approach comes from Julius Gatune. He developed three pillars to 
development aid that more resemble trade, which he describes in his article, “Africa’s 
Development Beyond Aid: Getting Out of the Box.” Knowledge, entrepreneurship, and 
governance are his bedrocks to developing a new business class, facilitated through 
diaspora and faith-based organizations. He makes a strong case that this approach will 
transform aid recipients into trade generators, and thus, partners better able to negotiate 
with foreign interests.53 
The U.S. form of aid and trade is still developing. As theories evolve, U.S. 
methods should look beyond its borders to others, especially competitor practices. What 
the United States lacks, may be found in China’s style of sub-Saharan Africa economic 
engagement, which may have a much larger impact on increasing respective GDPs than 
traditional forms of aid or trade, alone, something that may become evident, further on.  
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V. CHINA IN CONTRAST 
The China-Africa relationship is troubling for many in the West, but some believe 
that it is a good match for both developing regions.54 Mao’s aid policy beginning in the 
1950s purported to help other developing countries.55 In fact, China was the first 
developing nation to have a policy. Then, the 1960s brought “China’s Eight Principles of 
Economic and Technical Aid.” From these, the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence,” espousing equality and symbiosis among countries, were born.56 This 
mutual relationship crystalized Beijing’s view of aid, not as a handout, but as an 
exchange between sovereigns. As such, China is able to respect all recipient countries’ 
sovereignty and places no conditions on its aid.57 Lenient low or no-interest loans are one 
of the ways in which China accomplishes this goal. Although their methods are not 
exempt from criticism, scholars increasingly acknowledge that Chinese methods are 
successful for Africans in the sub-Saharan region.58 The Chinese work with existing 
political structures, acknowledging a countries’ sovereign right to function without 
intervention.59 The Chinese use their soft-styled aid tactics with the expressed goals of 
mutual economic benefit and no political interference, which is referred to as the Beijing 
Consensus.60 
Some scholars contend that China’s efforts have proven to be effective and are 
producing results in Africa.61 The country differs from the United Sates on its sub-
Saharan Africa policy in significant ways. Evidence suggests that Chinese foreign policy 
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presumes a strong link in overall economic engagement strategy on the continent. In 
“Determinants of Foreign Aid to Africa: A Comparison of the United States and China,” 
Claggett, Munemo, and Zhang show that while U.S. interests are focused on countries’ 
needs for the development of populations and governing institutions, Chinese strategic 
economic interests are the determining factors in their foreign aid distribution.62 China’s 
version of ODA comes in four types: grants, zero-interest loans, concessional (fixed-rate, 
low-interest) loans, and debt relief. They use these forms for many things including 
African student scholarships to China, medical aid, infrastructure, technological and 
architectural projects, agricultural assistance, training and youth programs, and material 
goods relief (made in China).63 Normally, OECD donations are ODA-type monies and 
generally do not do much OOF funding. China is the opposite with the bulk of their funds 
coming through other official flows. Its OOF funding comes in many forms: export 
credits, market-rate export buyer’s credits, commercial loans from Chinese banks, and 
equity loans for private Chinese businesses through the China-Africa Development 
(CAD) fund. The CAD was established with one billion USD for Chinese enterprises in 
Africa.64  
Since China releases few details on its foreign assistance, observers must 
carefully watch public announcements. For instance, the New York Times reported that 
China doubled its sub-Saharan African foreign aid lending based on President Hu Jintao’s 
2012 speech, where he pledged $20 billion in funds to be distributed over the following 
three years for infrastructural and agricultural needs. In that speech, Jintao also 
announced that his country would mount programs to increase training and education 
opportunities for aspiring sub-Saharan Africa leaders, improve drinking water, and 
protect forests—all of which is an interesting foreign aid twist for China. Of course, the 
normal trade concessions are attached to any recipient country. All Chinese aid monies 
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are tied to trade in some way.65 Tying monies to trade is not necessarily bad for the sub-
Sahara or elsewhere. In his study, Ali Zafar notes the growing relationship between 
China and Africa, “China’s economic ascendance over the past two decades has 
generated ripple effects in the world economy,” and “China’s search for natural resources 
to satisfy the demands of industrialization initially led it to Africa.”66 Clearly, sub-
Saharan Africa has been the largest beneficiary of China’s own remarkable growth. The 
resulting network of trade established within that region has consistently increased 
commodity prices and surplus revenues. Managed correctly, sub-Saharan African 
countries are potentially able to reinvest this money into infrastructure, such as schools 
and roads. Zafar highlights, “trade between China and Africa in 2006 totaled more than 
$50 billion, with Chinese companies importing oil from Angola and Sudan, timber from 
Central Africa, and copper from Zambia.”67 The same alliance has led to growth in other 
sub-Saharan countries, which thus demonstrates China’s growing involvement in the 
continent.68 In a Center for Strategic International Studies speech, Mr. Li Ruogu, 
chairman and president of China’s Ex-Im Bank, clearly expressed a key aspect of the 
Chinese foreign aid policy for Africa: 
China’s foreign aid caters to the long-term development of the recipient 
countries. It believes that [economic] development is the best way to 
eradicate ignorance, terrorism and turbulence and the most viable option 
to social progress and democracy. China’s aid thus focuses primarily on 
infrastructure development and assists recipient countries to set up free 
trade areas and export processing zones.69  
China does not just invest and then walk away; rather, it personally ensures that 
local infrastructure projects are completed for future growth and expansion. The dual 
effect of China’s establishing trade ports is that the country obtains access to Africa’s rich 
                                                 
65 Jane Perlez, “With $20 Billion Loan Pledge, China Strengthens Its Ties to African Nations,” New 
York Times, July 19, 2012. 
66 Ali Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, 
Trade, Investment, and Aid Links,” The World Bank Research Observer 22, no. 1 (2007): 115–120. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Li Ruogu, “China-Africa Relations: Thoughts on China’s Foreign Aid” (speech, Center for Strategic 
International Studies, April, 12, 2007). 
 18 
resources while generating new streams of revenue that allow the region to prosper. The 
end result is a rise in commodity prices leading directly to a rise in GDP growth, as noted 
in a recent World Bank report, “with commodities dominating their exports, most African 
countries benefitted from the surge in commodity prices in the earlier half of 2011, 
particularly oil exporters.”70 Simply, Chinese-style aid focuses on economic potential.  
Sub-Saharan African leaders seem to support this kind of economic partnering 
(receiving aid to provide public works in exchange for resource access). Julius Anyu, in 
“Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” offers cautious support of 
these Chinese tactics in Africa, saying they bring exploitation, as well as opportunity. It is 
up to Africans, he says, to temper the foreign involvement to best suit themselves, and if 
they do this well, their countries could be significantly improved.71 China claims that its 
unconditional aid is more than an attractive marketing strategy, and actually, is the 
natural consequence of a reciprocal partnership approach pursuing success for both 
entities.72 It argues that both China and the sub-Saharan African states it is supporting are 
each mutually leveraging economic and political gains from the other. Sarah Raine adds 
in “China’s African Challenges,” that African diplomacy aids Chinese diplomatic 
status.73 Certainly, it is evident in the way the Chinese have gathered developing world 
votes before world governance bodies, as in the UN assembly.74 Those same supporters 
believe that despite localized problems, the strategic Chinese relationship also amplifies 
African clout in a historical context of Western dominance.75  
Despite purported Chinese successes, author Horace Campbell finds in his work, 
“China in Africa: Challenging U.S. Global Hegemony,” that one of China’s biggest 
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challenges is keeping its flow of capital into Africa from flowing off the continent. He 
observes that state-to-state arrangements will usually result in this sort of problem. He 
proposes a grassroots solution of civil society engagement between Africans and partners 
as a basis for aid or trade to stem “off-shoring.”76  
Other observers charge that China’s politically unconditional, but economically 
tied aid, is only a tool for its ultimate goal of monetary gain at the expense of others that 
tramples all other considerations for development transitions, human rights, and the 
environment they leave behind.77 Some critics assess China as having a conqueror 
mindset regarding the African continent, even perpetuating the systemic regional 
weakness of sustainability and governance. They note that predatory actions on the scale 
of China could destabilize fragile structural reforms amounting to a form of neo-
colonialism, which fundamentally captures political systems.78 Despite critics’ claims, 
China enjoys economic success in sub-Saharan Africa, and many sub-Saharans have 
positively benefited. As Weisbrod and Whalley assert, “Chinese investment has resulted 
in modest but significant GDP growth in African countries.”79 Members of the 
international community charge that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) partners 
with those in power, without any ethical consideration, enabling human-rights abuses.80 
Also, Chinese influence is growing in modalities: economic, security, and governmental. 
Given its methods without Western ethics attached, it could end up endangering the 
advancement of democratic reform and harm U.S. interests.81 Another downside is 
highlighted in “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” by 
Sautman, Barry, and Yan. They describe the “Beijing consensus” model as diplomatically 
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brokered investment and infrastructure exchanged for Chinese trade concessions 
(usually) supporting substantial resource flows out of Africa and back to mainland China, 
absent reciprocal China-to-sub-Saharan Africa imports, which thus creates massive trade 
imbalances.82  
Despite the aforementioned problems, sub-Saharans increasingly believe that the 
Chinese model is more appropriate and effective at changing both their national 
economies and lives. A 2007 Pew poll found that, overwhelmingly, “most African 
nations view China as a more helpful foreign investor than the United States.”83 In fact, 
the governments of Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, Senegal, Rwanda, and Angola have all 
publically stated their preference for Chinese over Western aid.84 This preference reflects 
China’s swelling presence on the continent and underscores that sub-Saharan countries 
are choosing different relationships with the United States and China. 
The fact is that indigenous markets existed both before and throughout the 
colonial period, writes Bruce Bartlett in his article, “The State and the Market in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” It has been argued that the introduction of the colonial state system 
actually interfered with these natural capitalistic enterprises. Thus, ironically, states were 
the obstacle not capitalism.85 That reasoning asserts Africa’s future is not related to aid, 
but rather to education, entrepreneurship, and structural reform, expanding from 
traditional patrimonial networks. According to Gatune, those governments can complete 
this expansion through cultivating social networks across ethnic boundaries and thereby 
precipitating larger indigenous markets. Thus, the solution is to increase sub-Saharan 
owned trade.86  
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VI. DATA ANALYSIS 
Recalling that little reported aid or trade distinction exists among the various 
types of Chinese-African economic activity for the years studied, and that it is intended to 
benefit the Chinese, either directly or indirectly, this study only considers it comparable 
to U.S. trade. No equivalent to U.S. aid exists, and therefore, is not compared to Chinese 
activity in this paper. U.S. aid is only correlated with sub-Saharan Africa GDP percent 
change alone. Drawing from the GAO and World Bank data, H1 and H2 are calculated 
and the results are compared in Figure 1 and Table 1 using the following formula.87 
Figure 1.  Formula for Finding the Correlation 
 
Table 1.   Sub-Saharan Africa GDP Growth Correlated with U.S. and 












2001 5.5878 8.6 29.1 1.45 
2002 4.4636 9.8 24.7 2.3 
2003 3.0337 15.1 33.6 4.54 
2004 6.4250 24 46.1 3.8 
2005 5.2298 32.2 62.4 4.9 
2006 5.6819 44.9 73.2 6.5 
2007 6.1183 59 83.4 6.9 
2008 4.6429 86.8 106.7 10 
2009 3.1237 70.6 63.1 9.4 
2010 5.5899 100.7 83.3 9.3 
Invest Totals:  451.7 605.6 59.09 
GDP Growth 
Correlations:  0.0257 0.2111 - 0.1804 
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• The data analysis supports H1: 0.211124334 > - 0.180466983 
Total U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates greater positive 
correlation to GDP growth than U.S. aid in the same economies for the 
time period from 2001 to 2010. 
• The data analysis supports H2: 0.211124334 > 0.025736156 
U.S. trade demonstrates a greater positive correlation to sub-Saharan 
African GDP growth than total Chinese trade in the same economies for 
the time period from 2001 to 2010. 
U.S. development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa underperforms trade in both 
cases by significant margins, and while Chinese methods outperform U.S. aid, it is 
roundly underperforming when compared to U.S. trade alone. The fact that U.S. aid 
competes so poorly against trade from both countries is significant. Considering China 
conflates its form of aid with trade and yet is still outdone by U.S. trade further supports 
that the trade argument is a second significant finding.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Solid evidence purports that Chinese interests in Africa are purely economic and 
exploit natural resources and improve its strategic global position, while the U.S. method 
aims to foster sustainability and a real future for Africa.88 Of course, each viewpoint has 
supporters and critics. The tension and importance of the debate substantiates the need for 
an objective analysis of U.S. and Chinese models of economic engagement on the 
subcontinent. China implicitly links aid to trade. Its result is not measurable by normal 
foreign aid standards, which could benefit sub-Saharan Africa more so than U.S. aid 
alone. 
Based on the analysis, this research supports a trade model, in general, which 
appears to be most instructive for the United States’ and sub-Saharan African countries’ 
mutual development goals, continuing the trend towards increased U.S. investment in 
African business. This conclusion assumes the data captured reflects reality and the idea 
that a country’s social wellbeing is generally related to its economic wellbeing. Of 
course, a necessary long-term corollary of trade is sustained profitability of all parties 
engaged in a transaction. Therefore, the United States must simultaneously pursue its 
own economic interests in Africa, while directly advancing security goals and partnering 
equitably with host nation countries and companies. Taking a few notes from China, 
increased official U.S. focus on sub-Saharan trade over aid may have the effect of 
positively influencing sub-Saharan Africa GDP growth. 
The assertion is matched by a recent uptick in U.S. business initiatives in sub-
Saharan Africa. If anything more is to be learned from China’s policy, it is that 
strategically linking both aid and trade could possibly increase the United States’ impact 
by raising its aid correlation to positive numbers. The United States’ trade correlation 
outperforms U.S. aid and all Chinese economic activity. Again, this assertion indicates 
that trade is superior and should be a country’s primary focus.  
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Finally, although China is often dubbed a U.S. economic competitor in sub-
Saharan Africa, any objective success that China has had on the African continent should 
continue to be studied to see whether the United States should further incorporate some 
of their methods, with the caveat that the use of such means does not ultimately 
compromise U.S. values. Therefore, creating shared market opportunities for sub-Saharan 
African and U.S. entrepreneurs may be the best method to achieve this result. The 
prioritization of trade and the linking of aid may naturally encourage African partner 
conformity to ethical U.S. practices. Perhaps, the United States should some face hard 
truths with regard to aid effectiveness and GDP growth, rather than to continue 
smothering, through aid dependency, those it is intending to save. In the future, 
successful economic sustainability may best resemble select portions of both the U.S. and 
Chinese engagement styles with, importantly, empowered sub-Saharan African trading 
partners.  
 25 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
African Press Organisation. “Africa: State Department in Collaboration with Meridian 
International Center Hosts Innovation Summit and Mentoring Partnership with 
Young African Leaders.” News release. June 12, 2012. 
———. “United States Department of State Announces Follow-on Training for the 
African Women Entrepreneurs Program.” News release. October 6, 2012. 
Alden, Chris. “China in Africa.” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 147–164. 
Alden, Chris, and Daniel Large. “China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of 
Delivering Difference in Africa.” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 
(2011): 21–38. 
Anyu, J. Ndumbe, and J. P. Afam Ifedi. “China’s Ventures in Africa: Patterns, Prospects, 
and Implications for Africa’s Development.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 4 
(2008): 91–110. 
Bartlett, Bruce. “The State and the Market in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Economy 12, 
no. 3 (September 1989): 293–314. 
Bauer, Peter. Dissent and Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. 
Blank, Rebecca. “Expanding Access to New Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa for 
American Businesses.” Guest Blog on Commerce Blog, November 30, 2012. 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1221234039/13C685EF7DF
5F2DD339/10?accountid=12702. 
Brautigam, Deborah. “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How 
Much?” In Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Jane 
Golley and Ligang Son. Canberra: Australia National University Press, 2011. 
Brixiova, Zuzana. “Unlocking Productive Entrepreneurship in Africa’s Least Developed 
Countries.” African Development Review 22, no. 3 (September 2010): 440–451. 
Brown, David E. Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s Advance in Africa Is 
Underestimated and Africa’s Potential Underappreciated. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012. 
Campbell, Horace. “China in Africa: Challenging U.S. Global Hegemony.” Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 89–105. 
 26 
Claggett, E. Tylor, Jonathan Munemo, and Lijuan Zhang. “Determinants of Foreign Aid 
to Africa: A Comparison of the United States and China.” Journal of Global 
Commerce Research 2, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 40–50.  
Dagne, Ted. Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues (CRS report no. RL33591). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 
Davies, Mark. “Fertilizer by Phone.” Innovations Case Narrative.” Edited by Iqbal 
Quadir. MIT Press 7, no. 4 (2012): 5–15. 
Davis, Susan. “Enabling Entrepreneurial Ecosystems.” Innovations: Technology, 
Governance, Globalization 7, no. 2 (2012): 3–10. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ 
innovations/v007/7.2.davis.html. 
Dugger, Celia W. “U.N. Report Cites United States and Japan as the ‘Least Generous 
Donors.’” New York Times, September 8, 2005.  
Easterly, William. “Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in 
Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Growth 11, no. 4 (2006): 289–
318. 
Englebert, Pierre, and Denis M. Tull. “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed 
Ideas about Failed States.” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 106–
139. 
Fore, Henrietta H., and Panel. “Partnership to Support Entrepreneurs in Africa.” 
Moderated speech, Washington, DC, April 15, 2008. 
Gatune, Julius. “Africa’s Development beyond Aid: Getting Out of the Box.” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 632 (November 2010): 
103–120. 
Gill, Bates, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison. China’s Expanding Role in 
Africa: Implications for the United States. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2007. 
Gootnick, David. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in United States and Chinese Economic 
Engagement (GAO-13-199). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2013. 
Grimm, Sven, Rachel Rank, Matthew McDonald, and Elizabeth Schickerling. 
Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information of 
Chinese External Financial Flows. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Stellenbosch 
University Center for Chinese Studies, 2011.  
 27 
Grosh, Barbara, and Gloria Somolekae. “Mighty Oaks from Little Acorns: Can 
Microenterprise Serve as the Seedbed of Industrialization?” World Development 
24, no. 12 (December 1996): 1879–1890. 
Guerrero, Antonio. “In from the Cold.” Global Finance 24, no. 2 (2010): 24–26. 
Jason Z. Yin, and Sofia Vaschetto. “China’s Business Engagement in Africa.” Chinese 
Economy 44, no. 2 (2011): 43–57. 
Klare, Michael, and Daniel Volman. “America, China, and the Scramble for Africa’s 
Oil.” Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 108 (June 1, 2006): 297–309. 
Larson, Greg. “A Needle in a Haystack: How a New Tool Is Unlocking Entrepreneurship 
in Africa.” Kennedy School Review 12 (2012): 77–80.  
Perlez, Jane. “With $20 Billion Loan Pledge, China Strengthens Its Ties to African 
Nations.” New York Times, July 19, 2012. 
Pew Poll. “How the World Sees China.” 2007. http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/12/11/ 
how-the-world-sees-china.  
Population Crisis Committee. The International Human Suffering Index for 141 
Countries. Washington, DC: Population Crisis Committee, 1992. 
Power, Marucs, and Giles Mohan. “Towards a Critical Geopolitics of China’s 
Engagement with African Development.” Geopolitics 15, no. 3 (2010): 462–495. 
Raine, Sarah. China’s African Challenges. New York: Abingdon, Oxon 2009. 
Reilly, James, and Bates Gill. “The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa.” Washington 
Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2007): 37–52. 
Ruogu, Li. “China-Africa Relations: Thoughts on China’s Foreign Aid.” Speech, Center 
for Strategic International Studies, April, 12, 2007. 
Rupp, Stephanie. “Africa and China: Engaging Postcolonial Interdependence.” In China 
into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 66–85. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., John W. M C Arthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, 
Chandrika Bahadur, Michael Faye, and Gordon Mc Cord. “Ending Africa’s 
Poverty Trap.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2004.  
Sautman, Barry, and Yan Hairong. “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with 
Africa.” African Studies Review 50, no. 3 (2007): 75–114. 
 28 
Shultz, Richard, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard. Armed Groups: A Tier-One 
Security Priority (INSS Occasional Paper 57). USAF Academy, CO: USAF 
Institute for National Security Studies, 2004. 
Weisbrod, Aaron, and John Whalley. The Contribution of Chinese FDI to Africa’s Pre 
Crisis Growth Surge. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2011. 
Wolin Neal S. “Deputy Secretary Wolin to Visit Central and Southern Africa November 
10–12, 2012.” Press release, Federal Information & News Dispatch, 2012. 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1150133169/13C689B48E1
67B57CE1/17?accountid=12702. 
World Bank Group, The. Global Economic Prospects January 2012 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Annex. Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2012. 
World Bank, The. “GDP per Capita (Current US$).” Last modified February 10, 2013. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.  
———. “The World Bank GDP Growth (Annual %).” Accessed February 12, 2013. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg. 
Zafar, Ali. “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links.” World Bank Research 
Observer 22, no. 1 (2007): 103–130. 
 29 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
